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SECOND ORDER REGARDING

PETITIONERS' ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS

IN THE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DOUGLAS

RICKY DEAN MILLER, an individual, MARTIN SWISHER, JR., an individual, JOSEPH GIRDNER, an individual, and ROBBE LEHMANN, an individual,

Petitioners,

2023-CV-00162

VS.

DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, SUSAN JANSEN, Trustee, Douglas County School District, TRUSTEE DAVID BURNS, Trustee, Douglas County School District, TRUSTEE KATHERINE DICKERSON, Trustee, Douglas County School District, and TRUSTEE DOUG ENGLEKIRK, Trustee, Douglas County School District,

Respondents.

On October 10, 2024, this Court entered its Order Regarding Petitioners' Attorney's Fees and Costs; Civil Penalties holding that Petitioners are entitled to recover from Respondent Douglas County School District ("DCSD") and Respondent Trustees Susan Jansen, David Burns, Katherine Dickerson and Doug Englekirk ("Trustees") their costs and reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to NRS 239.011(2).1 The Court directed briefing as to the amount

THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

¹ Other orders of the Court touching on these issues are incorporated by reference and not repeated herein.

of the attorney's fees and costs award and apportionment amongst These issues are ripe for determination and the Respondents. Court issues its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On May 17 and July 26, 2023, Petitioners requested public records contained within DCSD's servers and Trustees' personal cell phones and electronic devices. DCSD, through its counsel, produced some responsive documents from DCSD's servers and Trustees' personal electronic devices but denied the existence of additional responsive public records. Not convinced, Petitioners

Utilizing DCSD's counsel, DCSD and Trustees answered in unity, again denying the existence of additional responsive public records. DCSD and Trustees maintained this stance for an extended time, ultimately volunteering to search servers and personal electronic devices to prove their point. The searches instead proved Petitioners' point as an additional 500 pages of responsive public records on DCSD's servers and 6,136 pages of responsive public records on Trustees' personal electronic devices were discovered. DCSD and Trustees produced the additional records in July 2024, approximately one year after case inception.

Petitioners demand their reasonable attorney's fees and costs from DCSD and Trustees.

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ANALYSIS

Petitioners are "entitled to recover from the governmental
entity that has legal custody or control of the record [their]
costs and reasonable attorney's fees in the proceeding." NRS
239.011(2)(emphasis added). "A 'proceeding' is [t]he regular and
orderly progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events
between the time of commencement and the entry of judgment." LVRJ
v. Clark County Office of the Coroner/Medical Examiner, 138
Nev.Adv.Op. 80, 521 P.3d 1169, 1175 (2022) (internal quotation and
citation omitted). A live controversy exists until all the
requested records have been produced and outstanding issues
regarding penalties, attorney fees and costs have been resolved.
LVMPD v. LVJR, 2023 WL 5341113, 2 (Unpublished, Nevada Supreme
Court, Augusts 18, 2023, No. 82867, 83430, 84308) (\$200,000
attorney's fees/\$3,000 costs requested). The number of records
ultimately produced has no bearing, even one page is sufficient.
The mens rea of the governmental entity has no bearing, attorney's
fees are compensable even if records were accidentally withheld or
withheld in good faith.

Whether a governmental entity has legal custody or control of a public record is an issue of fact. See Comstock Residents Ass'n v. Lyon Cty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 134 Nev. 142, 148, 414 P.3d 318, 323 (2018). There is no contention here that any entity other than DCSD is the governmental entity having legal custody or control over documents contained on its servers and each individually named Trustee is the governmental entity having custody or control over documents maintained on his or her personal electronic devices. The Court so finds.

Each named governmental entity failed to produce responsive 1 records within its legal custody or control for nearly one year 2 after Petitioners brought suit. Blame for the unacceptable and 3 unreasonable delay falls solely and equally on DCSD and each 4 individually named Trustee. See, Order Regarding Respondents' 5 Motion to Stay and/or Enforce Settlement Agreement, May 31, 2024, 6 ("To be clear, Respondents do not need a court order or a 7 settlement agreement to search servers and cell phones in response 8 to public records requests and nothing that this Court or 9 Petitioners have done during the scope of this litigation has 10 prevented Respondents from previously conducting the very search 11 that they now desire to perform"). Each governmental entity's 12 failure to timely produce responsive records within its respective 13 custody or control spurred and perpetuated the lawsuit. With one 14 exception noted below, the Court holds DCSD and each individually 15 named Trustee jointly and severally liable for Petitioners' 16 reasonable attorney's fees and costs in the proceeding. 17 239.011(2). 18

The Court next considers the reasonableness of Petitioners' requested attorney's fees (\$162,290.00) and costs (\$3,791.16). Respondents generally assert Petitioners' attorney's fees are grossly and patently unreasonable even though Respondents' attorneys billed DCSD over \$149,000.00. Amongst the factors relevant to the determination are those set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The qualification and experience of Petitioners' counsel is not contested nor is the reasonableness of the charged hourly rate. Although the character of work involved in public records cases

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is often simple, a number of challenging issues arose due to the course taken by Respondents. Respondents do not contend that Petitioners' counsel did not actually perform the work claimed. All of the work claimed was related to Petitioners' efforts to obtain public records from DCSD and Trustees. Petitioners' motive in requesting the public records is irrelevant. Petitioners succeeded in recovering "reams" of responsive records. The Court finds no evidence of "over working" the case or proceeding without reasonable grounds or in bad faith. Each Brunzell factor weighs favorably for Petitioners.

DCSD and Trustees cite multiple grounds for reducing Petitioners' requested attorney's fees and costs.

1) Blocked Billing

Given the Court's ruling as to joint and several liability, the blocked billing method utilized by Petitioners' counsel does not present a roadblock to apportioning liability amongst Respondents. Nor has the Court found it difficult to assess the character of the work done or the work actually performed by Petitioners' counsel. The Court does not require further briefing and does not reduce or eliminate Petitioners' attorney's fees on account of the blocked billing methodology.

2) Time Prior to Second Amended Petition/Joinder of Trustees

All iterations of the Petition complain that DCSD and Trustees failed to produce requested public records. At anytime prior to the filing of any iteration of the Petition, DCSD and Trustees could have simply produced the requested records. They did not. The mere fact that Petitioners might have made procedural mistakes or suffered adverse rulings in righteous

pursuit of legal recourse presents no basis to reduce the attorney's fee award. The Court takes note of the efforts Petitioners were forced to employ just to get Trustees served.

3) Attorney's Fees Accruing after Failed Settlement

On March 27, 2024, the parties placed a settlement agreement on the record. The terms of the proposed settlement merely required DCSD and Trustees to do that which the law requires; conduct adequate searches, produce responsive records and pay Petitioners' then-accrued attorney's fees of \$70,000. Given the financial component, the settlement was necessarily contingent on DCSD Board approval.

DCSD's Board rejected the settlement, prompting Petitioners to continue pursuit of the lawsuit. In July 2024, DCSD and Trustees produced 6,636 pages of responsive records. DCSD and Trustees now argue that their untimely production put a hard stop on compensable attorney's fees.

The Court disagrees. Given the timing and quantity of the production, it was reasonable for Petitioners' counsel to continue to work the case and push forward with the hearing. Recall, DCSD and Trustees vociferously denied the existence of additional responsive documents for over one year before producing 6,636 pages of responsive documents shortly before the hearing. Against this backdrop, Petitioners are not faulted for failing to accept Respondents' representation to the effect of, "No other responsive documents exist, we really mean it this time, believe us." This is particularly so given that DCSD and Trustees did not comply with this Court's order requiring detailed affidavits/declarations of compliance in reference to the searches. See, Order Regarding

Respondents' Motion to Stay and/or Enforce Settlement Agreement,
May 31, 2024. Petitioners' reasonable attorney's fees accrued
after the failed settlement are compensable.

The Court finds distinction between DCSD and Trustees in assessing responsibility for perpetuation of the lawsuit after the failed settlement. DCSD and its counsel initially took on and defended Trustees, proclaiming a unified defense decrying the existence of additional responsive documents on DCSD's servers and Trustees' personal devices. DCSD and Trustees held a united front with joint representation through the attempted settlement agreement placed on the record on March 27, 2024. The settlement required the approval of DCSD's Board, a contingency completely outside of Trustees' control given Trustees' inability to vote due to conflict. Three DCSD trustees not named in the lawsuit ("Non-Party Trustees"), acting collectively as the DSCD Board and, ergo, DCSD2, voted against settlement. It matters not for the purpose of this order why the settlement was rejected by DCSD. material and undeniable, however, that DCSD's rejection of the settlement caused Petitioners to accrue additional attorney's fees and costs and substantially delayed the legally required production of responsive records (the settlement called for DCSD not only to search its own servers but also to facilitate and pay for forensic searches of Trustees' personal devices). Absolutely nothing, including the DCSD vote, precluded DCSD from proceeding with the searches of DCSD's servers and Trustees' phones, as agreed by Trustees. However, DCSD's rejection of the settlement

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MINDEN, NV 89423

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 $^{^2}$ While DCSD may be sued without its board being named (NRS 386.010 and NRS 12.105), DCSD's Board is the body corporate (NRS 386.110(1)) having the rights and powers provided to school districts in NRS Title 34 (NRS 385.005(1).

drove a wedge between DCSD and Trustees necessitating that each pursue independent counsel. The Court finds that the delay occasioned by the failed settlement is attributable to DCSD, not Trustees and not Petitioners. The Court holds DCSD solely accountable for Petitioners' reasonable post-settlement attorney's fees.

4) Meetings/Communication with Sharla Hales

The financial components of the attempted settlement, as well as any other efforts to settle the financial components, necessarily involved Non-Party Trustees. Non-Party Trustees engaged Sharla Hales, Esq., and voted to reject the proposed settlement. Since Trustees could not vote due to conflict, the votes of Non-Party Trustees, acting collectively as DCSD's Board, killed the settlement. Subsequent efforts made by Petitioners to salvage settlement necessarily ran through Ms. Hales. Time spent by Petitioners' counsel corresponding with Ms. Hales was work towards resolution of Petitioners' public records requests and the resultant reasonable attorney's fees are compensable pursuant to NRS 239.011(2).

Board Meetings/Agenda Items

Work performed by Petitioners' counsel as to the subject board meetings and agenda items was work towards Petitioners' public records requests. The resultant reasonable attorney's fees are compensable pursuant to NRS 239.011(2).

6) Reply to Opposition to Second Amended Petition

Respondents question whether Petitioners' reply to the Second Amended Petition was legally authorized and question the time spent drafting the same. Respondents never moved to strike the

reply and the Court considered the reply. The reply presents as a reasonable, good faith response to the opposition and the corresponding attorney's fees are compensable pursuant to NRS 239.011(2).

7) Communications w/ DCSD Counsel

Trustees object to being held responsible for attorney's fees attributable to discussions between Petitioners' counsel and DCSD's counsel. DCSD and Trustees had the same attorney until after settlement failed. Given that the Court is not holding Trustees liable for Petitioners' attorney's fees accrued after the failed settlement, this issue is moot.

8) Motion to Amend/Reconsider

Petitioners' motion to amend and/or reconsider was part of the proceedings for which Petitioners are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to NRS 239.011(2). The Court ruled against Petitioners on the merits but the motion was not unreasonable or pursued in bad faith. The corresponding attorney's fees are both reasonable and compensable.

9) Costs

All costs requested by Petitioners were reasonably incurred in pursuit of public records from DCSD and Trustees in this proceeding and are compensable.

Conclusion

The Court finds that Petitioners requested attorney's fees of \$162,290.00 and costs of \$3,791.16 were reasonably accrued by Petitioners in this proceeding and Petitioners are entitled to the same. NRS 239.011(2).

The total award of \$166,081.16 is payable by Douglas County

School District, \$70,000.00 of which is joint and several with each of the named Trustees.

\$70,000.00 of the total award is payable by Trustee Susan

Jansen in her capacity as a governmental entity, joint and several

with DCSD and other named trustees.

\$70,000.00 of the total award is payable by Trustee David
Burns in his capacity as a governmental entity, joint and several
with DCSD and other named trustees.

\$70,000.00 of the total award is payable by Trustee Katherine Dickerson in her capacity as a governmental entity, joint and several with DCSD and other named trustees.

\$70,000.00 of the total award is payable by Trustee Doug Englekirk in his capacity as a governmental entity, joint and several with DCSD and other named trustees.

Petitioners shall prepare, circulate and submit a proposed judgment and, upon entry thereof, serve notice of entry on all parties as provided in NRCP 58.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this $2/\frac{5^{t}}{2}$ day of February, 2025.

THOMAS W. GREGORY

DISTRICT JUDGE

P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423

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THOMAS W. GREGORY DISTRICT JUDGE NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT P.O. BOX 218 MINDEN, NV 89423